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INTRODUCTION
It seldom happens that a scholar makes a lasting contribution both to legal
history and to the most pressing constitutional issues of the day in the same
work. It is more rare that an academic does so in a book accessible to a general
audience. Perilous Times1 accomplishes that feat. For these reasons, and for
another as well, the book should be regarded as a triumph.
University of Chicago Law Professor Geoffrey R. Stone has written an
important work of constitutional history, not only because of what he has to say,
but also because of the time in which he says it. The tragedy of September 11,
2001 generated reactions by every branch of the federal government, as well as
by the general public and a host of public-regarding institutions in American
society. Each of those reactions has implicated the balance between liberty and
security that historically has been tested in this country during times of crisis.
Perilous Times lucidly constructs and conveys the nation’s accumulated lessons
of experience from the Sedition Act of 1798 to recent events in the “war on
terrorism,” thereby arming Americans with some of the knowledge necessary to
grapple successfully with the challenges of our own time. Professor Stone, in
other words, offers not just a bracing reminder of historic threats to America’s
celebrated civil liberties tradition, but also a constitutional compass for current
use in a world that has changed in important respects yet remains much the
same.
Some legal academics who read Perilous Times may be inclined to conclude
that the book covers well-traveled historical ground without embodying the
hallmarks of “cutting-edge” scholarly analysis: insights that are subtle, clever,
* Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University School of Law. B.A. (Econom-
ics, Political Science) Duke University, 1994; M.A. (Economics) Duke University, 1995; J.D./Ph.D.
(Jurisprudence & Social Policy) University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), 2001.
© 2005, Neil S. Siegel. The author is grateful to Stuart Benjamin, James Boyle, Erwin Chemerinsky,
Robert Post, H. Jefferson Powell, Jedediah Purdy, and Scott Silliman for instructive feedback and to
Mark Sigmon for excellent research assistance. The author dedicates this essay to Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg—inspiration, mentor, and friend.
1. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO
THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
1645
novel, counterintuitive, arcane, or provocative. Such a quick dismissal of Peril-
ous Times would be a serious mistake for several reasons. First, although most
of the episodes treated in the book will be familiar to historically-minded
readers, Professor Stone combines a lively presentation of the facts with a
critical eye toward the constitutional issues at stake.
Second, the integrative historical work he performs amounts to an impressive
and useful scholarly contribution in itself. Specifically, Perilous Times tells a
story with a balanced, two-fold moral that is sobering yet ultimately affirming
of America’s capacity to learn from past mistakes and make moral and constitu-
tional progress. In six historical periods, Professor Stone finds that the federal
government and the citizenry overreacted, needlessly sacrificing civil liberties at
the altar of perceived threats to national security. In each period, however, there
were heroes—politicians, jurists, journalists, and political dissenters of lower
station and great courage—who realized that the country was betraying the
principles to which it aspires and who summoned the fortitude to speak out.
After each episode, moreover, some learning took place; our country returned to
a more liberty-friendly equilibrium, with the historical trend pointing in the
direction of greater protection of civil liberties. Yet because today’s repression
does not tend to be the same as yesterday’s, our country has difficulty learning
the more general lesson that national crises lead to repression. By clearly
identifying a disturbing historical pattern in which current governmental con-
duct is implicated, Professor Stone contributes to the project of preventing
current and future repression.
Third, and most importantly, we are currently at war, and at this critical
juncture, Professor Stone’s book embraces an idea that the ever-increasing
intellectual sophistication of academic constitutional lawyers may cause them to
undervalue. In the case of the constitutional virtues, familiarity does breed
contempt—or, at least, “inattention,” as the late, great Professor Ely once noted
in a different setting.2 But at this moment in American history, defenses of the
chastening power of civil liberties to protect dissenters and other minorities
must not be left solely to the pages of the popular press. By virtue of its very
accessibility to most citizens, Perilous Times instantiates its own compelling
theme by helping to create the culture of civil liberties in this country that its
author champions.
Perilous Times can profitably be evaluated on three levels by asking a series
of questions. First, does the book adequately defend its normative conclusion
that unjustified deprivations of civil liberties have taken place throughout
American history during wartime? Second, are Professor Stone’s reform propos-
als likely to succeed by facilitating a more appropriate balance between liberty
and security in times of national crisis? Third, does Perilous Times offer a
useful framework for assessing the government’s actions since September 11?
2. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) (arguing that
“‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction in terms”).
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The three parts of this Review address each of those questions in turn.
Perilous Times is excellent in its descriptions and normative assessments of the
relevant history, notwithstanding some relatively modest concerns about the
empirical sample from which the book draws its conclusions. The lessons of
history it develops, moreover, remain highly relevant in a post-September 11
world. The book’s proposals for reform, however, are less strong. This vulnerabil-
ity is due not to any failing on Professor Stone’s part, but rather to how
challenging it proves to significantly reduce the likelihood of repression in times
of crisis. Without a further transformation of social values in America, it is
difficult to see how Professor Stone’s mechanisms will do much to alleviate the
pressures he identifies as having caused the excesses of the past.
Yet this sobering reality should not lead us to lose sight of the intellectual and
civic achievement embodied in Perilous Times. Americans often fail to see how
current governmental conduct continues a disturbing historical pattern. Ulti-
mately, Professor Stone’s greatest contribution in helping to prevent future
repression lies in his identification of that trend. Perilous Times equips Ameri-
cans to integrate and appreciate the judgments of the court of history, thereby
rendering our national community somewhat better able to resist the repressive
urge.
I. HISTORICAL FINDINGS
A. PROFESSOR STONE’S HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The subject of Perilous Times is the fate of free speech in particular, and civil
liberties more generally, in the United States during six periods of armed
conflict. Professor Stone observes that “[t]he United States has attempted to
punish individuals for criticizing government officials or policies only during
six episodes in our history.”3 He devotes most of the book to investigating each
of those episodes.
The first occurred at the end of the eighteenth century, when America was on
the brink of war with France and Congress passed the Sedition Act of 1798.
That statute criminalized the publication or utterance of a disloyal statement
against the federal government, Congress, or President with the intent to bring
them into contempt or disrepute.4
More than a half-century later, in the midst of the Civil War, President
Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus,5 disarming the judiciary from
reviewing the legality of the arrests and detentions of individuals who criticized
3. STONE, supra note 1, at 12.
4. Id. at 33–44.
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. For a good recent discussion of the Suspension Clause, see Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2660–74 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is worth noting—because it is
often overlooked—that a suspension of the writ does not alter the government’s legal duties or a
detained individual’s rights; rather, it precludes any governmental liability for violations. Id. at 2683
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I do not see how suspension [of the writ of habeas corpus] would make
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the Lincoln Administration.6 Included among them was the widely censured
military tribunal conviction of Clement Vallandingham, a leader of the Copper-
heads who was imprisoned and later exiled for condemning President Lincoln,
the Emancipation Proclamation, the military draft, and the war itself.7
Fast-forwarding some sixty years, the Wilson Administration silenced opposi-
tion to America’s participation in the First World War. Two famous resisters
were Emma Goldman and Mollie Steimer, fierce opponents of American interven-
tion.8 Pursuant to the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, the
federal government prosecuted about 2,000 people for opposing the war and the
draft; individuals convicted under those statutes were regularly sentenced to
prison terms ranging from ten to twenty years.9 The most famous victim may
have been Eugene Debs. The recipient of a million votes as the Socialist Party’s
presidential candidate during the 1912 election, he was arrested, prosecuted, and
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for denouncing the war and conscrip-
tion.10
A quarter-century later, in the midst of World War II, a severe civil-liberties
problem was triggered by the federal government’s forcible internment of
120,000 people of Japanese descent who were not suspected of any wrongdo-
ing.11 Fred Korematsu was perhaps the most recognizable surviving member of
that suspect class, as a result of a Supreme Court decision that bears his name.12
At the urging of President Roosevelt, moreover, the federal government sought
to suppress dissent “by prosecuting, denaturalizing, or deporting those who
questioned [America’s conduct of] the war, especially American fascists.”13
Picking up where World War II left off, the early years of the Cold War
marked “one of the most repressive periods in American history.”14 Endeavor-
ing to stifle criticism, the federal government imposed uncompromising loyalty
programs, conducted invasive legislative investigations, and criminally pros-
constitutional otherwise unconstitutional detentions ordered by the President. It simply removes a
remedy.”).
6. STONE, supra note 1, at 80.
7. Id. at 94–108.
8. Id. at 138–46.
9. Id. at 12, 146–53, 184–91.
10. Id. at 196–97.
11. Id. at 287.
12. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming petitioner’s conviction for
remaining in part of a designated “military area” from which persons of Japanese ancestry had been
ordered excluded). In 1983, Mr. Korematsu filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis to have his
conviction set aside for “manifest injustice.” Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409
(N.D. Cal. 1984). Judge Marilyn Patel granted his petition. Id. at 1420. As Professor Stone relates,
“Judge Patel found that in its presentation of evidence to the federal courts in the course of Korematsu’s
prosecution and appeal, including in the U.S. Supreme Court, the government had knowingly and
intentionally failed to disclose critical information that directly contradicted key statements in General
DeWitt’s final report, on which the government had asked the courts to rely.” STONE, supra note 1, at
306; see also infra note 52 and accompanying text.
13. STONE, supra note 1, at 12.
14. Id. at 312.
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ecuted leaders and members of the United States Communist Party.15 This part
of the Cold War was a time dominated by Senator Joseph McCarthy and the
House Un-American Activities Committee.16
During the Vietnam War of the late 1960s and early 1970s, antiwar protesters
organized huge political demonstrations and engaged in extensive civil disobedi-
ence. Political violence erupted at times—for example, at the 1968 Democratic
National Convention and at Kent State University, where students were shot and
killed.17 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) tried to impede the efforts of
political dissidents; the federal government sought to have the New York Times
and Washington Post enjoined from publishing the “Pentagon Papers,” which
had been leaked to the newspapers by Daniel Ellsberg; and the government
prosecuted protesters for showing contempt for the American flag and burning
draft cards.18 The Vietnam War was a time of deep social tension, during which
America also bore witness to student strikes, teach-ins, and the Supreme Court’s
emphatic rejection of an administration’s claims of national security.19
“In each of these episodes,” Professor Stone relates, “the nation faced
extraordinary pressures—and temptations—to suppress dissent.”20 Perilous Times
explores how the federal government and the public responded to those pres-
sures, critically evaluating their performances and clarifying the circumstances
in which they proved most willing to yield to temptation.21 The book concludes
by turning from past to present, assessing in a coda the impact of the Bush
Administration’s prosecution of the “war on terror” on civil liberties.22
As should be clear from this brief overview, the reference to “Free Speech in
Wartime” in the full title of Perilous Times, while reflecting the book’s principal
focus, understates the breadth of the work’s descriptive and normative concerns.
A more appropriate choice of subtitle would have been “Civil Liberties in
Wartime.” The issue here is more rhetorical than substantive, but it is nonethe-
less real. Because the central civil-liberties questions arising out of the federal
government’s response to September 11 have to date had little to do with the
suppression of political dissent, as Professor Stone himself notes,23 Perilous
Times might strike some potential readers as less relevant to current events than
it actually is. “Although this work focuses on freedom of speech rather than on
civil liberties more generally,” Professor Stone writes, “the central lessons apply
across the board.”24 His claim is correct, and it explains the attention he gives to
15. Id. at 312–14.
16. Id. at 373–93.
17. Id. at 459–71.
18. Id. at 471–82, 500–16.
19. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (“The Pentagon Papers Case”)
(rejecting the government’s attempt to stop publication of Vietnam War documents).
20. STONE, supra note 1, at 13.
21. Id. at 528–50.
22. Id. at 550–57.
23. Id. at 551.
24. Id. at 13 n.*.
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President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Japanese
internment during World War II. “Wartime psychology,” Justice Jackson has
instructed us, “plays no favorites among rights but tends to break down any
right which obstructs its path. And the fall of one weakens others.”25
Another aspect of the book’s coverage is implicit in the above summary but
deserves explicit mention. In discussing each historical episode, Professor Stone
separately investigates the conduct of each branch of the federal government.
He further evaluates the behavior of those individuals who had the greatest
impact on events over the course of two centuries. They include the Presidents:
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin
Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and George W.
Bush.26 Also scrutinized are the Supreme Court Justices: Samuel Chase, who
came close to impeachment for his judicial conduct in enforcing the 1798
Sedition Act; Roger Taney, whose 1861 order was flatly ignored by President
Lincoln; Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, who initially lost the
battle within the Court over free speech in the World War I era but eventually
won the war; and Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, Hugo Black, and Earl
Warren, who struggled with the question of free speech for Nazis and Commu-
nists.27 Finally, Professor Stone pays close attention to the conduct and argu-
ments of the dissidents, including (in addition to those mentioned above)
Matthew Lyon, the first person prosecuted under the 1798 Sedition Act; the
self-proclaimed “Hitler of America” William Dudley Pelley; Communist Party
leader Eugene Dennis; blacklist victims Lillian Hellman and Dalton Trumbo;
and draft-card burner David Paul O’Brien.28 Professor Stone’s discussion of this
compelling array of personalities, whom he fairly calls “some of the most
interesting characters in American history,”29 makes for highly enjoyable read-
ing. So do the many rare photographs, posters, and illustrations that adorn
various pages of the book.
B. STONE’S HISTORICAL THESIS
According to Professor Stone, the most important lesson of history regarding
the choices Americans have made between liberty and security during perilous
times is compelling and unambiguous: “[T]he United States,” he concludes,
“has a long and unfortunate history of overreacting to the dangers of wartime.
Again and again, Americans have allowed fear to get the better of them.”30
While recognizing that “each of the six episodes we have examined presented a
distinct challenge,” his judgment is that “in every instance the nation went too
25. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 112 (1951).
26. STONE, supra note 1, at 13.
27. Id. at 13–14.
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id. at 528.
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far in restricting civil liberties.”31
Acknowledging that his conclusion cannot be proven by the verbal or logical
equivalent of a mathematical proof, Professor Stone nonetheless finds support in
inferential reasoning:
Certainly, we know that in every one of these episodes the nation came after
the fact to regret its actions and to understand them, in part, as excessive
responses to war fever and/or government manipulation. The Sedition Act of
1798 has been condemned in the “court of history,” Lincoln’s suspensions of
habeas corpus were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Ex
parte Milligan, the Court’s own decisions upholding the World War I prosecu-
tions of dissenters were all later effectively overruled, and the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II has been the subject of repeated
government apologies and reparations. Likewise, the Court’s decision in
Dennis upholding the convictions of the leaders of the Communist Party has
been discredited, the loyalty programs and legislative investigations of that
era have all been condemned, and the efforts of the U.S. government to
“expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize” antiwar activities during the Viet-
nam War have been denounced by Congress and the Department of Justice.32
Professor Stone does not view such “after-the-fact judgments” as controversial
or surprising: “Fear, anger, and fervent patriotism naturally overwhelm the
capacity of individuals and institutions to make clearheaded judgments about
risk, fairness, and danger.”33 Moreover, he contends, fearful citizens demand
protection from their leaders, who are quick to respond by decreasing the risk to
the majority at the expense of minority “others,” whether “Jacobins, secession-
ists, anarchists, Japanese Americans, Communists, or hippies.”34 “This is not
theory,” Professor Stone chillingly concludes. “It is the unimpeachable lesson of
history.”35
Professor Stone convincingly demonstrates the United States’s unnecessary
sacrifices of civil liberties during these six periods of national crisis. At this
moment in our country’s history, moreover, the moral of Professor Stone’s story
belongs on anyone’s short list of urgent messages for Americans and their
leaders to understand. Indeed, some of the quotations in the book practically
jump off the page because they are so obviously relevant to the conduct of
officials in Washington in the wake of September 11.
In describing the near-war with France in 1798, for example, Professor Stone
writes: “Blurring the line between dissent and treason, Federalists accused
Republicans of disloyalty.”36 He further relates that “[t]he leading Federalist
31. Id.




36. Id. at 28.
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journal . . . coined the statement ‘He that is not for us, is against us.’”37
Compare those statements with this language at the end of the book:
[L]ike previous wartime leaders, members of the Bush administration have
used fear to their political advantage and tarred their opponents as “disloyal.”
Shortly after September 11, President Bush warned, in terms strikingly reminis-
cent of language used by Adams, Wilson, and Nixon, “You are either with us
or with the terrorists.” Although the president was referring specifically to
other nations, Attorney General John Ashcroft went even further, castigating
American citizens who challenged the government’s restrictions of civil
liberties: “To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America’s
enemies.”38
Although close correspondences such as these might cause skeptical readers to
question whether some of the historical narrative in Perilous Times is results-
oriented, Professor Stone extensively documents his bottom line regarding
history’s unambiguous verdict. He shows that the country was not made notice-
ably safer by the wartime repression that has occurred throughout American
history.
Perilous Times is all the more timely because its basic theme, while sobering,
also is hopeful and full of respect for humankind’s ability to rise above its
initial, base reactions. One of the principal messages in Perilous Times is that
America can improve its record. Cautious optimism is warranted, Professor
Stone submits, for three reasons.
“Despite the fears that swept the nation in the periods we have examined,” he
first notes, “some individuals maintained a sense of perspective and recognized
that the demands for suppression were unwarranted.”39 Congressmen Gallatin
and Livingston in 1798, for example, recognized that the Federalists were
attempting to silence, and thereby destroy, the political opposition through
intimidation; they stressed the draconian chilling effect on core political speech
that the Sedition Act would impose; and they rejected publicly the notion that a
political opinion, as opposed to an objective fact, could be proven true or
false.40 Those two leaders possessed as much foresight as they had fortitude; it
was not until 1974 that the Supreme Court would affirm: “Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”41
Second, Professor Stone observes, “the nation did not always succumb to
wartime hysteria. Many proposals for the suppression of speech were rejected in
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id. at 551–52.
39. Id. at 532.
40. Id. at 25–33.
41. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
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these periods because individuals in positions of authority understood them to
be unwise.”42 To return to the example of the Sedition Act of 1798: As offensive
to modern free-speech principles as it was, it was significantly less so than other
proposals considered and rejected by Congress at the time, one of which would
not have recognized truth as a defense.43
Third, Professor Stone insists, “[o]ver time, we have made progress. . . .
[T]he major restrictions of civil liberties of the past would be less thinkable
today than they were in 1798, 1861, 1917, 1942, 1950, or 1969.”44 The humor
in one of Professor Stone’s examples helps to make his point: “A reasonable
analogy to the prosecution of Eugene Debs during World War I would be the
prosecution of Howard Dean in 2004 for his opposition to the war in Iraq.”45
Today, Professor Stone might have suggested, all Americans can safely smile at
the notion of such a prosecution only because our country has learned some of
the painful lessons of the past:
In terms of both the evolution of constitutional doctrine and the development
of a national culture more attuned to civil liberties, the United States has made
substantial progress. This is a profound and hard-bought achievement. We
should neither take it for granted nor underestimate its significance. It is a
testament to the strength of American democracy.46
The balance between critique and praise—pessimism and optimism—evident in
such passages lends credibility to the author’s argument.
For all these reasons, Professor Stone concludes that Americans are not
doomed to make the same mistakes again. In suggesting that learning is
possible, he offers welcome reassurance that our efforts to resist excess in
wartime need not amount to a continual exercise in futility:
It is, of course, much easier to look back on past crises and find our
predecessors wanting than to make wise judgments when we ourselves are in
the eye of the storm. But that challenge now falls to this generation of
Americans. Freedom of speech can endanger security, but it is also the
fundamental source of American strength. As Justice Louis Brandeis ex-
plained in 1927, “Those who won our independence . . . knew that . . . fear
breeds repression” and that “courage is the secret of liberty.” Those are the
two most central lessons for Americans to bear in mind.47
Professor Stone calls on citizens and leaders to have the courage of America’s
most enduring convictions. He identifies courage in the face of fear as the
42. STONE, supra note 1, at 532.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 533.
45. Id. at 551.
46. Id. at 533.
47. Id. at 557.
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ultimate prescription for perilous times.
Professor Stone offers an encouraging alternative to the historical account of
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. Judge Posner, though acknowledging
“that when a nation is surprised and hurt there is a danger that it will overreact,”
nonetheless suggests “it is only with the benefit of hindsight that a reaction can
be separated into its proper and excess layers.”48 Among other rhetorical
questions, Judge Posner asks: “In hindsight we know that interning the Japanese-
American residents of the West Coast did not shorten World War II. But was
this known at the time? If not, should not the government have erred on the side
of caution, as it did?”49 He thus reveals himself to be one of very few legal
commentators prepared to defend Korematsu.50
Judge Posner offers a counsel of despair. He fails to explain how the
Americans whose stories Professor Stone tells had the benefit of foresight at the
moment the country was overreacting, or how our nation has proven itself better
able to distinguish proper from excess over the years, even at the time of action.
When they are heeded, in other words, the lessons of history afford us the rough
equivalent of a retrospective vantage point in the present moment. Respectfully,
therefore, Judge Posner errs in suggesting without qualification that “it is only
with the benefit of hindsight that a reaction can be separated into its proper and
excess layers.”51
Contrary to Judge Posner’s submissions, moreover, strong evidence exists that the
federal government knew at the time that the Japanese Americans subject to the
internment orders did not pose a threat. Internal government reports attested to
the loyalty of Japanese Americans. Peter Irons’s work, for example, shows that
the government intentionally lied in justifying the internment.52
48. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 299 (2003).
49. Id.
50. The Chief Justice, too, defended the Korematsu Court’s decision to uphold the internment of
Japanese aliens, and he criticized the Court only mildly for upholding the internment of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME 203–09 (1998); see Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (1999)
(reviewing Rehnquist’s book).
51. POSNER, supra note 48, at 299.
52. See Peter Irons, Introduction to JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT
CASES 5–6 (Peter Irons ed., 1989) (“The evidence at issue in the Justice Department records dealt with
claims by General John L. DeWitt, the Army officer who directed the West Coast evacuation and
internment programs, that Japanese Americans were disloyal as a racial group and had committed acts
of espionage on behalf of Japan. DeWitt had made these claims in an official Army report that had been
refuted by other federal agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission, the Office of
Naval Intelligence, and the FBI. Disturbed by the ‘suppression of evidence’ that attested to the
overwhelming loyalty of Japanese Americans and by the presentation to the Supreme Court of DeWitt’s
‘lies’ about espionage by this group, two of the Justice Department lawyers assigned to the cases—
Edward J. Ennis and John L. Burling—had mounted a determined but futile effort to persuade Solicitor
General Charles Fahy that he had an ‘ethical obligation’ to give the Supreme Court the true facts in the
cases. Over these protests, Fahy assured the Court in defending Korematsu’s conviction that he stood
behind every ‘line, word, and syllable’ of DeWitt’s disputed report.”); see also PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT
WAR 278–310 (1983) (criticizing the DeWitt report); supra note 12.
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Further, Judge Posner neglects a fundamental point. Let us assume counterfac-
tually that some number of Japanese Americans posed a threat. Even under
those circumstances, mass internment—involving the use of race to determine
who would be free and who would be interned—constitutes an unconscionably
blunt instrument of national security. Surely, the core conservative commitment
to colorblindness is not subservient to administrative convenience on the domes-
tic front during wartime.53
For these reasons, the verdict of history is decidedly different from Judge
Posner’s. In direct response to the episode of the Japanese internment, Congress
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned
or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress.” The legislative history makes clear that the enactment of § 4001(a)
was animated in large measure by Congress’s rejection of the federal govern-
ment’s conduct towards Japanese Americans during World War II.54
This is for the best. Judge Posner’s logic is disturbing in its implications.
What kind of executive action would it exclude? If “it is only with the benefit of
hindsight that a reaction can be separated into its proper and excess layers,”55
then, for example, there exists no way to assess objectively the wisdom of a
proposed policy of detaining all Muslims in this country for security reasons
until the “war on terror” has been won—whenever that is. No reasonable
person, including Judge Posner, would defend such a policy. But Judge Posner
offers no reassurance that the Muslim-detention hypothetical is distinguishable
from the general view he espouses, which is so unsustainable that he contradicts
it later in the same chapter. He writes that “the measures taken during World
War I and the Red Scare that followed . . . should have been perceived as
hysterical, or basely political, or both, at the time.”56
It might be suggested that the above criticism, and the Muslim-detention
hypothetical in particular, is not fair to Judge Posner—that there is an innocent
and undeniable sense in which only hindsight can resolve disputes over how
much our society should constrict civil liberties during wartime to survive or
avoid catastrophic losses of life. Judge Posner’s defense of Korematsu is
53. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (“In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American.”). But see Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1157 (2005) (Thomas J., joined by Scalia,
J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s holding that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review for an
equal protection challenge to a state policy of racially segregating prisoners in double cells for up to
sixty days whenever they enter a new correctional facility based on the proffered rationale that such
segregation prevents racial gang violence).
54. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (plurality) (“Congress passed § 4001(a) in
1971 as part of a bill to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 . . . which provided procedures for
executive detention, during times of emergency, of individuals deemed likely to engage in espionage or
sabotage. Congress was particularly concerned about the possibility that the Act could be used to
reprise the Japanese internment camps of World War II. H.R. REP. NO. 92-116 (1971); id., at 4 (‘The
concentration camp implications of the legislation render it abhorrent’).”).
55. POSNER, supra note 48, at 299.
56. Id. at 308.
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deliberately inflammatory, so the argument might run, but his phraseology
ought not obscure the insight behind his implicit observation that the govern-
ment must make momentous decisions in situations of genuine uncertainty and
grave threat. Indeed, if the Muslim-detention hypothetical is not unfair to Judge
Poser, then it does not go far enough. After all, if there is literally no way to
assess now whether current government actions taken to combat terror are
excessive, why stop at Muslims? Why not really err on the side of caution and
detain indefinitely all opponents of the war or all critics of the Bush Administra-
tion? Judge Posner cannot possibly be endorsing such totalitarian conduct.
There is truth to this perspective, but the directionality of Judge Posner’s
hyperbole remains troubling. It is one thing to exaggerate for the sake of effect
to unsettle received views that are insufficiently considered; it is quite another
when one’s hyperbole serves only to reinforce past errors. Judge Posner’s
defense of Korematsu falls into the latter category: The case illustrates that the
political branches and the courts need greater sensitivity to civil liberties in
times of national crisis, not less.
Fortunately, Professor Stone offers a welcome corrective: Americans need not
throw up their hands in the struggle to balance liberty and safety during times in
which their security is endangered. We can distinguish “proper” from “exces-
sive” by mustering the courage to honor our constitutional commitments and
rationally “to connect cause and effect.”57
None of this is to suggest that the balance between liberty and security must
remain the same no matter how acute the threat to the nation’s safety. That straw
man is not the message of Perilous Times. For all but the most knee-jerk,
doctrinaire civil libertarians, the tragedy of September 11 changed the thinking
of concerned Americans. Professor Stone’s powerful point, rather, is this: In
light of this nation’s regrettable record of overreacting during times of crisis—
its tendency systematically to underprotect liberty rather than underprotect
security—both citizens and government officials alike should skeptically scruti-
nize the claims of any governing administration that certain liberty-reducing
measures are necessary to protect the public safety. They should ask whether a
persuasive logical connection exists between the liberty-reducing powers the
government seeks and the security enhancements it promises. If such a nexus is
reasonably perceived, moreover, they should inquire whether the measures
appear cost-justified in terms of the civil-liberties protections that would be
sacrificed.
57. STONE, supra note 1, at 547. Judge Posner offers the contrary submission that the real “lesson of
history” is that “[o]fficialdom has repeatedly and disastrously underestimated” dangers to the nation’s
security—for example, the failure to anticipate the Pearl Harbor and September 11 attacks. POSNER,
supra note 48, at 298–99. In response, Professor Stone notes the lack of any “evidence that the nation’s
overprotection of constitutional rights caused these misjudgments. ‘Pragmatic constitutional reasoning’
should make some effort to connect cause and effect.” STONE, supra note 1, at 547. Judge Posner offers
no such evidence, nor does any appear to exist.
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C. PROFESSOR STONE’S SAMPLE
Professor Stone submits that the six historical episodes he explores can be
divided into two groups of three according to the intensity of the suppression of
dissent. Whereas public or governmental intolerance of dissenting voices was
especially severe in 1798, World War I, and the Cold War, the urge to silence
dissidents was less intense in the Civil War, World War II, and the Vietnam War.
The most important explanation for this discernible difference in attitude,
Professor Stone suggests, was “the extent to which national political leaders
intentionally inflamed public fear.”58
For example, there existed broad public support for our country’s participa-
tion in World War II; accordingly, dissent never threatened to demoralize or
divide the American people, and President Roosevelt perceived no need to
instigate a public attack on political dissent.59 During World War I, by stark
contrast, President Wilson “faced the challenge of rallying a nation to fight a
war even though it had neither been attacked nor threatened with attack. To
create an ‘outraged public’ and inspire citizens to make the sacrifices war
demands, Wilson . . . fostered a public mood of fear, anger, and rabid patrio-
tism.”60 According to Professor Stone, “[h]istory teaches that it is the interac-
tion of ‘ordinary’ war fever with cynical efforts by opportunistic political
leaders that is most likely to result in what Jefferson called ‘the reign of
witches.’”61
Perilous Times’ identification of the independent variable most responsible
for the country’s systematic overreactions during six wartime episodes in
American history is convincing and potentially useful. The United States has
fought in several other conflicts, however, and Professor Stone does not explic-
itly explain why he does not discuss the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the
Spanish American War, Korea, or the first Gulf War. He does state that “[t]he
United States has attempted to punish individuals for criticizing government
officials or policies only during six episodes in our history.”62 The implication is
that no widespread suppression of speech took place during the five conflicts
just mentioned. Insofar as that is correct, the question arises whether Professor
Stone’s strong conclusions are partly affected by selection bias—that is, the
choice of which wars to study. At the very least, the reader of Perilous Times
would benefit from an explanation of why five of the conflicts in which the
United States has fought did not generate serious civil liberties concerns on the
home front.
Professor Stone may not have adequately examined American history in
coming to his normative conclusions for another reason. This country has
58. STONE, supra note 1, at 533.
59. Id. at 533–34.
60. Id. at 534.
61. Id. at 535.
62. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
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endured episodes of repression outside the wartime context—such as the anti-
Masonic hysteria of the 1820s and early 1830s;63 the Mormon persecution of
the 1840s and 1850s;64 antebellum repression of anti-slavery voices, including
censorship of the United States mails;65 repression of anarchists after the
Haymarket Riot of 1886;66 the targeting of socialists and the labor movement
during the late nineteenth century;67 the Red Scare of 1919–1920 in the
immediate aftermath of World War I;68 the criminal syndicalism laws of the
1920s and 1930s;69 and attacks against civil-rights advocates by many Southern
communities in the 1960s.70 It is not apparent, therefore, that a wartime setting
is either necessary or sufficient for the existence of systematic repression in this
country, and the book’s central focus on six wartime episodes does not reflect
that lesson of experience. Such concerns, however, are relatively modest.
Perilous Times covers the periods in American history during which civil
liberties were most vulnerable. A wealth of historical evidence supports the
book’s conclusions.
II. REFORM PROPOSALS
A. PROFESSOR STONE’S DIAGNOSES OF PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Professor Stone suggests that in a democratic society, “[a] critical determi-
nant of how the nation responds to wartime is the attitude of the public itself.”71
He believes that the public responded quite well in some of the six episodes,
such as when the citizenry voted the Federalists out of power in 1800, and when
63. See, e.g., ALICE F. TYLER, FREEDOM’S FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY TO 1860, at
351–58 (1944).
64. See, e.g., LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE
LATTER-DAY SAINTS 44–64 (1979).
65. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 155–81 (2000); CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-
THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH 196 (Harper & Row 1964) (1940) (“A valuable case history in the
use of censorship to restrict social criticism, extending far beyond the requirements of public safety, is
afforded by the experience of the ante-bellum South in imposing a rigid censorship on incoming mail
from the Northern states. The Southern record demonstrates the difficulty of suppressing pernicious and
dangerous propaganda without at the same time destroying the literature of reform, of protest, and of
sanative criticism.”).
66. See, e.g., JOHN A. GARRATY, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH, 1877–1890, at 166–70 (1968); see also
STONE, supra note 1, at 143 (discussing the Haymarket Riot).
67. See, e.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). Eugene V. Debs appears at various points in Professor
Stone’s narrative. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 1, 141–42 (discussing Debs’s life and opposition to
World War I).
68. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 1, at 220–25. As this citation shows, Professor Stone discusses the
Red Scare at some length.
69. See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 383–84 (citing E. FOSTER DOWELL, A
HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1939)).
70. See, e.g., MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH (2d ed. 1995).
71. STONE, supra note 1, at 535.
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even Republican newspapers and party members during the Civil War objected
to the military’s particularly egregious attempts to squash Democratic and
Copperhead dissent.72 “More often, however, the public either has failed to
protest the suppression of dissent or vociferously demanded and supported it,”
for instance during World War I and the early Cold War.73 “With few excep-
tions,” Professor Stone disturbingly submits, “even the traditional bulwarks of
civil liberties—the legal profession, higher education, the press, ‘liberal’ politi-
cians and intellectuals, and committed civil libertarians—were unwilling to
confront the storm of public accusation and condemnation.”74
Professor Stone argues that citizens must come to internalize a robust concep-
tion of civil liberties, including the duty to tolerate and even to consider
dissenting views. He suggests that the public must understand why civil liber-
ties matter, why citizens must safeguard them, and how the pressures of
wartime can threaten individual rights. In this regard, he maintains that the
media, organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union, educational
institutions, government agencies, foundations, and the legal profession can
play a critical role in nurturing “a culture of civil liberties.”75
Turning from the public to the federal government, Professor Stone observes
that Congress has enacted the Sedition Acts of 1798 and 1918, as well as the
McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950. His assessment is blunt: “This is a
dreary record of legislative achievement.”76 Congress has shown an ability to
exercise restraint, he acknowledges, but most often “it has either failed to
exercise a check on public hysteria or, in some instances, moved far beyond
anything the public demanded.”77 The Sedition Act of 1798 is a good example
of the latter phenomenon.78 Enacted in the name of national security but
actually aimed at allowing the Federalists to achieve partisan advantage over the
Republicans, that statute would appear in almost any constitutional lawyer’s
short list of the most constitutionally offensive statutes ever enacted by Con-
gress. Some members of Congress knew better and spoke out—for example,
Congressmen Gallatin and Livingston in 1798—but they were exceptional.
“More often, Congress responds to war fever with draconian legislation.”79
As proposals for reform, Professor Stone suggests certain rules or protocols.
One would prohibit Congress “from enacting wartime legislation that limits
dissent without full and fair deliberation.”80 Another would mandate that such
72. Id. at 536.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 537.
76. Id. at 538.
77. Id.
78. The 1798 Sedition Act may be a classic instance of a principal-agent problem. The Act served
the interests of members of Congress better than it did the interests of their constituents. Accordingly, it
is unsurprising that Congress went further in suppressing dissent than most citizens desired.
79. Id. at 539.
80. Id.
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legislation contain a “sunset” provision “requir[ing] reconsideration no less than
annually.”81 Professor Stone asserts that “Congress could also respond better in
the future by taking the Constitution more seriously,” a suggestion he believes
cannot be dismissed as naı¨ve because “Congress does attempt to act within the
confines of the Constitution, particularly when it has guidance from the Su-
preme Court, and even in time of war.”82
Professor Stone concludes that “[a] similar evaluation applies to the execu-
tive.”83 Whereas Presidents Adams, Wilson, and Roosevelt could hardly be
deemed champions of free speech in 1798, 1917, or 1942, Presidents Lincoln
and Truman “did better.”84 Interestingly, he maintains that “[p]erhaps the single
most important step presidents can take to improve the response of the execu-
tive branch in future crises is to ensure that every administration has within its
highest councils individuals who will ardently and credibly defend civil liber-
ties.”85 Professor Stone regards it as “no coincidence that Harry Truman adopted
the federal loyalty program at a time when his inner council lacked such a
voice, and one of the most serious concerns about the administration of Presi-
dent George W. Bush is the absence of any senior official representing civil
libertarian views.”86
Turning to the judiciary, Professor Stone contends that “it is appropriate for
courts to take the special circumstances of wartime into account in determining
whether the government has sufficient justification to limit the constitutional
right at issue.”87 He insists, however, that courts must not “abdicate their
responsibilities in the face of assertions of national security or military neces-
sity.”88 He therefore rejects the argument that courts should recognize their own
limitations in the face of exigencies and suspend the ordinary standards of
judicial review, deferring to the political branches when faced with allegedly
grave questions of national security. In Professor Stone’s view, “[t]he compara-
tive advantages of courts over the executive and legislative branches in interpret-
ing and enforcing constitutional rights are striking.”89 These advantages include
insulation from electoral political pressures and a greater concern for the
preservation of civil liberties.90 While acknowledging that courts must not
81. Id. at 540.
82. Id. at 540, 541.
83. Id. at 542.
84. Id. Because World War II did not trigger any significant political dissent, and because President
Roosevelt interned 120,000 people of Japanese descent, it might be more appropriate to suggest that he
was no champion of “civil liberties” as opposed to “free speech.”
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 543.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. There may be reason to question whether courts necessarily are more likely to preserve civil
liberties than are the political branches—certainly the Warren Court was. But throughout American
history, it is not obvious that courts generally were the institutions most concerned with protecting
individual rights. Compare, for instance, the work of the Reconstruction Congress with that of the
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impede the government’s ability to meet a crisis, he underscores the total lack of
historical basis for that concern: “Although Congress and the president have
often underprotected free speech in wartime, there is not a single instance in
which the Supreme Court has overprotected wartime dissent in a way that
caused any demonstrable harm to the national security.”91 Most often, in cases
such as Schenck v. United States,92 United States v. Dennis,93 and Korematsu v.
United States,94 “the justices have yielded too readily to their own fears or to
executive and legislative demands that they not stand in the way.”95
Professor Stone advises that “in periods of relative calm the Court should
consciously construct constitutional doctrines that will provide firm and unequivo-
cal guidance for later periods of stress.”96 He further recommends that “the
Court must define clear constitutional rules that are not easily circumvented or
manipulated . . . .”97 Brandenburg v. Ohio,98 he submits, constitutes a great
example of an instance in which the Court acted consistently with both sugges-
tions. In response to the submission that any measures the Court takes will be
futile because other avenues of oppression emerge just as soon as a liberty-
protective judicial decision is rendered,99 he observes that the government’s
attempts to eviscerate dissent “have become both more subtle and less effec-
tive” over time.100
Similarly, Professor Stone rejects as unduly pessimistic the “conventional
wisdom [based on decisions such as Korematsu and Dennis] that the Supreme
Court will not decide a case against the government on an issue of military
security during a period of national emergency.”101 The Court, he believes, “has
Taney Court. See, e.g., John E. Nowak, Federalism and the Civil War Amendments, 23 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 1209, 1215 (1997) (“The granting of broad power to Congress was necessary in the view of the
Framers, in part because it would have been unimaginable to them that the Supreme Court would be
composed of a majority of persons who would move faster than Congress to protect the civil liberties of
minority race persons.”).
91. STONE, supra note 1, at 544 (emphases added).
92. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding the conviction of an individual accused of violating the
Espionage Act for distributing leaflets criticizing the World War I draft).
93. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the conviction of an individual, over First Amendment objec-
tions, for attempting to organize the Communist Party).
94. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the military order committing thousands of people of Japanese
ancestry to internment camps).
95. STONE, supra note 1, at 545.
96. Id. at 548.
97. Id.
98. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (creating the “Brandenburg test,” according to which speech presenting a
grave danger of imminent lawless action to fall outside the First Amendment’s protections).
99. This is an illustration of a more general legal phenomenon, one evident in such other contexts as
campaign finance reform. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“We are under no
illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the matter. Money, like water, will
always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress will respond, are concerns for
another day.”). Whether successful reforms exceed successful evasions over time is context-sensitive
and inevitably contested.
100. STONE, supra note 1, at 549.
101. Id.
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a long, if uneven, record of fulfilling its constitutional responsibility to protect
civil liberties—even in time of war.”102 He cites as examples West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,103 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,104
Yates v. United States,105 and New York Times Co. v. United States (the
“Pentagon Papers” case).106 Moreover, because the political branches “have
consistently deferred to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amend-
ment,” he asserts that “these decisions have had a major impact on how the
United States responds to the exigencies of wartime.”107
B. EVALUATING PROFESSOR STONE’S REFORM PROPOSALS
The proposals for reform in Perilous Times are not as strong as the book’s
historical analysis. This relative weakness is not attributable primarily to any
intellectual failing on Professor Stone’s part; rather, it reflects the daunting
reality that the social forces he identifies are so difficult to control. Those forces
undermine the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to reduce the likelihood of
repression in perilous times.
To be sure, the public, various private organizations, the Congress, and the
Executive Branch ought to value civil liberties in periods of national crisis more
than they have historically. Beyond identifying for those entities repeated
historical excesses, however, it is not clear how to transform the values of
citizens and elected officials so that they come to view threats to civil liberties
more seriously than they do. It is one thing to inform people that our nation has
an unfortunate history of unjustified suppression of dissenting voices during
wartime; it is quite another to get them to care. And lest that concern be
dismissed as overly pessimistic, one should note that the Bush Administration’s
post-September 11 orientation towards civil liberties was essentially nonexistent
as a campaign issue during the last Presidential election.108
This is a key point. Congressional protocols, statutory sunset provisions, and
executive inclusion of liberty-friendly voices would help to safeguard human
freedom during crises, at least to some extent, in the ways Professor Stone
indicates. But a further transformation of social values is necessary to support
the consistent implementation of such protective measures. The challenge is
particularly daunting because the rights of dissidents and other minorities—not
members of the dominant, majoritarian culture—are most vulnerable in perilous
102. Id. at 550.
103. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (relying upon First Amendment principles to invalidate a regulation
requiring students to salute the flag).
104. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding unconstitutional President Truman’s wartime nationalization of
the steel mills).
105. 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (concluding that the Smith Act is limited to speech that incites illegal
action).
106. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting the government’s attempt to stop publication of Vietnam War
documents).
107. STONE, supra note 1, at 550.
108. See infra Part III for a discussion of civil liberties in the “war on terror.”
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times.109
Turning to the judiciary, we have seen110 that Professor Stone stresses the
role of clear rules in adequately protecting civil liberties during wartime:
As the Court has learned by experience and sustained reflection, if the nation
is to preserve civil liberties in the face of war fever, the Court must define
clear constitutional rules that are not easily circumvented or manipulated by
prosecutors, jurors, presidents, or even future Supreme Court justices. Mal-
leable principles, open-ended balances, and vague standards may serve well in
periods of tranquility, but they will fail us just at the point when we most need
the Constitution. As the law professor Vincent Blasi has argued, the Court
must establish firm principles in ordinary times in order to ensure that the
nation does not underprotect dissent in times of crisis.111
Professor Stone’s focus on the importance of constraining judicial discretion is
persuasive, and his reliance on Professor Blasi’s influential work is useful.
Professor Blasi provides an orienting interpretive framework that is powerful
and subtle, counseling judicial adoption of what he calls the “pathological
perspective”:
[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first amendment
to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of
unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and
most likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other
words, should be targeted for the worst of times.112
Professor Blasi writes that “[o]ne feature unites the various pathologies that first
amendment doctrine should be designed to combat: a shift in fundamental
attitudes or perceptions among one or another group of persons whose judg-
ments have an important influence on the general level and vigor of public
debate and private inquiry.”113 First Amendment doctrine and discourse, he
submits, should be articulated with an eye towards preserving, in the face of
pathologies, the long-run theoretical integrity and practical efficacy of our
constitutional tradition’s commitment to free speech.114
Nonetheless, Professor Stone’s reliance on the “pathological perspective” to
defend the virtues of clear rules in perilous times is problematic for several
109. To the extent the necessary reorientation of values can take place only outside the context of
wartime, an analysis of peacetime repression, see supra Part I.C, would seem critical as a supplement to
Professor Stone’s work. The author is grateful to The Georgetown Law Journal book reviews editor,
Charles C. Speth, for articulating that point.
110. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
111. STONE, supra note 1, at 548–49.
112. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
449–50 (1985).
113. Id. at 451.
114. Id. at 452.
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reasons. To begin with, Professor Blasi does not himself conceive a rule-
oriented approach as being of primary importance:
It would be a mistake to assume that the strategy for protecting the central
norms of the first amendment must emphasize the tactic of doctrinal compul-
sion—the fashioning of specific, highly protective tests that would bind lower
courts and officials in times of stress. It is doubtful that legal standards could
ever be designed with sufficient prescience and precision to achieve that type
of behavioral effect to any great degree.115
Instead, Professor Blasi stresses the efficacy of inculcating basic attitudes
regarding the value of free speech, procedural mechanisms and institutional
structures that are resistant to a panicky sense of urgency, and legal methodolo-
gies and doctrines that assume less in the way of judicial independence from
political pressures.116 “[C]ourts that adopt the pathological perspective,” he
argues, “should place a premium on confining the range of discretion left to
future decisionmakers who will be called upon to make judgments when
pathological pressures are most intense.”117 But Professor Blasi “view[s] prin-
ciples, precepts, and historical benchmarks as more important weapons in the
battle against pathology than legal standards, despite the fact that by their very
nature principles, precepts, and lessons of history must be more open-ended and
less binding than at least some legal standards can be.”118
Putting aside the reliance on Professor Blasi’s work, it is not clear that
Professor Stone is correct to place so much emphasis on the constraining power
of legal rules. The choice between bright-line rules and flexible standards
implicates a famously complicated jurisprudential and ideological debate.119
That choice, and the related debate in constitutional law between categorization
and balancing, cannot be made satisfactorily by focusing on the problem of
protecting civil liberties in wartime in isolation from other legal settings in
which the selection is relevant. Professor Blasi himself has written that “the
pathological perspective is just one of several considerations that should figure
in the formulation of first amendment doctrine.”120
Nor is it self-evident as a general matter (the conventional wisdom notwith-
standing) that rules constrain behavior more than standards. Rules, which lack
the chilling effect imposed by standards, may free individuals to pursue counter-
115. Id. at 467. Note that Professor Blasi does not distinguish between rules and standards in his
discussion. The distinction he makes between constraint and discretion, however, seems clear enough.
116. Id. at 467–69.
117. Id. at 474.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1991).
120. Blasi, supra note 112, at 495.
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purposive advantage right up to the line demarcated by the rule.121 Further,
rules often leave gaps or generate conflicts, rendering mechanical application
difficult or impossible; ostensibly vague standards, by contrast, may resonate
with the constraining effect of social norms.122 As it becomes increasingly
apparent that rules generate unfair results that turn on technicalities, moreover,
the pressure on regulators and the regulated to circumvent a rule-bound regime
will increase.123 A clear rule constrains less insofar as judges become less
prepared to enforce it.124
Particularly in a wartime setting, rigid rules may not be optimal if one’s goal
is to protect civil liberties. One might well prefer a flexible standard in a
situation where a clear rule is likely to push the government to adopt the (rigid)
exception to the general rule. Consider the recent Hamdi decision.125 If Con-
gress suspended the writ of habeas corpus in response to a hypothetical majority
opinion authored by Justice Scalia,126 the result would be worse from an overall
civil-liberties perspective than the outcome compelled by the actual Hamdi
plurality, which employed the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing analysis.127
In any event, the choice between rules and standards is of little consequence
by itself, because nothing within a rule or standard identifies the interpretive
filter through which either is applied. As Frederick Schauer has observed, “The
121. KELMAN, supra note 119, at 41; Kennedy, supra note 119, at 1773–74; Sullivan, supra note 119,
at 63.
122. KELMAN, supra note 119, at 44.
123. Id. Note that Kelman focuses only on those individuals subject to regulation. See Sullivan,
supra note 119, at 261 (“[D]ecisionmakers [may] spend time inventing end-runs around [rules] because
they just cannot stand their over- or under-inclusiveness.”).
124. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 1701 (arguing that rules become standards when “judges [are]
simply unwilling to bite the bullet, shoot the hostages, break the eggs to make the omelette and leave
the passengers on the platform”); cf. KELMAN, supra note 119, at 45, 49–51 (distinguishing the “real
operative rule” from the “nominal rule” based on the exceptionality of total rule enforcement).
125. See infra Part III.A for a fuller discussion of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
126. In his dissent in Hamdi, which was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia provides an
historical analysis whose conclusion is sweeping:
Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition
has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime. Where the
exigencies of war prevent that, the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, allows
Congress to relax the usual protections temporarily. Absent suspension, however, the Execu-
tive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention
without charge. No one contends that the congressional Authorization for Use of Military
Force, on which the Government relies to justify its actions here, is an implementation of the
Suspension Clause. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision below.
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referencing the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)).
127. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646 (“Mathews dictates that the process due in
any given instance is determined by weighing ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official
action’ against the Government’s asserted interest, ‘including the function involved’ and the burdens the
Government would face in providing greater process. 424 U.S., at 335. . . . The Mathews calculus then
contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of ‘the risk of an erroneous
deprivation’ of the private interest if the process were reduced and the ‘probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute safeguards.’ Ibid.”).
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‘ruleness’ of prescriptive language is not determined by the language itself. It is
determined instead by the norms of internalization of those to whom the
language is directed.”128 More specifically, Professor Schauer notes that “when,
as with the first amendment, and as with the idea of free speech itself, the rule
exists in open ended and theory-laden language, the likelihood of a rule simply
collapsing into its justification is great.”129 Professor Stone’s call for clear rules,
therefore, is insufficient. We also require a strong sense of what counts as the
relevant category—for example, what conduct our legal culture signifies by use
of the term “torture.”130 That meaning must be so deeply shared that it reso-
lutely resists collapse into underlying rationales or hijacking for extrinsic
rationalizations. The repressive forces Professor Stone means to control are so
powerful and pernicious precisely because they tend to undermine that shared
sense of meaning.
The basic point of the above analysis, it is worth underscoring, is not that
rules are necessarily undesirable, that the rules-versus-standards debate should
be resolved in favor of standards, or that doctrinal moves of the sort Professor
Stone advises can make no difference. Rather, the sobering lesson here concerns
the lack of cause for confidence that greater use of rules will prevent repetitions
of repression in times of war. There is no way for the judiciary to pre-commit to
adequately protecting civil liberties before an emergency occurs. In the Ameri-
can system of government, the balance between liberty and security during
national crises ultimately lies in the hands of Supreme Court Justices, and they
cannot avoid exercising the human faculty of judgment at the time of decision.
This is hardly to suggest, however, that decision makers will not better
execute their responsibilities if their judgments are informed by the lessons of
history. As discussed in the previous Part, one such lesson evident in Perilous
Times is that repression does not tend to repeat itself but takes new forms. The
World War I restrictions on speech, for example, have not been replicated, nor
has the Japanese internment. Those facts are important because they show that
American society learns from the past and often avoids repeating the same
mistakes. They substantiate Professor Stone’s contention that “we have made
progress. . . . [T]he major restrictions of civil liberties of the past would be less
thinkable today than they were in 1798, 1861, 1917, 1942, 1950, or 1969.”131
Another important implication, however, is that our country has difficulty
learning the more general lesson that crises lead to repression. Today’s unneces-
sary sacrifices of civil liberties are harder to prevent because they are not the
same as yesterday’s. We may feel a sense of enlightenment because there is no
sedition act or race-based internment, yet we often fail to see how current
128. Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 18 (1989)
(citing Richard Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 186–90 (1986)).
129. Id. at 22.
130. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
131. STONE, supra note 1, at 533.
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governmental conduct continues a disturbing historical pattern. In this regard,
Professor Stone’s greatest contribution in helping to prevent future repression
lies in his clear identification of that trend. A powerful way to avoid repeating a
problem is to recognize it as one instance of a regrettable, longstanding ten-
dency. Perilous Times allows Americans to throw a moral and constitutional
sea-anchor into history, one that renders our interpretive community a little
better at resisting the propensity to repress.132
Professor Stone employs history to advocate the value of rules in restraining
repression. But in the end it may be his historical description rather than his
jurisprudential prescription that offers the greatest promise of restraint. A shared
understanding of history and the revealed pathologies of law are weaker tethers
than we might wish. Yet it would be a shame if our theoretical sophistication
concealed from us how much better they are than nothing.
III. AFTER 9/11
It is instructive to consider Perilous Times in the context of recent events, and
not merely because the book concludes with a brief evaluation of the Bush
Administration’s responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.133
Professor Stone’s historical thesis helps to make sense of much that has
happened since September 11 by enabling readers to perceive in current events
the continuation of a pattern that has repeated itself throughout American
history.
A. THE ENEMY COMBATANT CASES
Have you ever gone to a movie and reacted incredulously when the credits
appeared on the screen because you could not believe the film was over when
important questions had not been resolved? Perilous Times leaves the impres-
sion of having ended too soon. Specifically, the Supreme Court completed its
October 2003 Term by rendering three historic decisions in terrorism cases
arising out of the tragedy of September 11: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,134 Rumsfeld v.
Padilla,135 and Rasul v. Bush.136 Though Professor Stone does not discuss the
132. Cf. James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and Justice,
51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 524 (1999) (“Integrity is many things. In part, it is a moral sea-anchor—a line
cast out into the past that seeks to tie together our present actions and our past commitments, to compel
us to contemplate the tension between the two. But integrity, at least as I have described it, is more than
a search for coherence; it is also a search for universalizable principle. The two dimensions of the
activity parallel one another. Just as the process of universalization makes us generalize synchronically,
forcing us to extend our principles to people we might have found it convenient to ignore, the move
towards coherence forces us to generalize diachronically, stretching out our actions and principles on
the examining table of time.”).
133. STONE, supra note 1, at 550–51.
134. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (discussed in the text below).
135. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). Jose Padilla is the American citizen who was apprehended by federal
agents in Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport upon arrival from Pakistan. He was transported to
New York on a material-witness warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern
2005] 1667A PRESCRIPTION FOR PERILOUS TIMES
Court’s holdings, they implicate several of the central themes in Perilous Times.
For example, and using history as a guide, it might be instructive to learn
Professor Stone’s assessment of each branch’s conduct in those cases.
Consider, for instance, the Hamdi litigation. As the Executive Branch pressed
the claim that the President possesses inherent authority as Commander-in-
Chief to designate an American citizen an enemy combatant and to detain him
indefinitely without access to counsel even absent congressional authoriza-
tion,137 the Congress did nothing. Not so the Supreme Court. Yet reasonable
people may disagree about whether the Court’s decision in Hamdi is best
viewed as strongly protective of civil liberties or as overly deferential to the
government’s asserted security interests.
In her plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice
O’Connor concluded that Congress had authorized Hamdi’s detention,138 but
she limited that finding of authorization (for the purposes of deciding the case)
to the individuals fighting against the United States in Afghanistan,139 and she
issued the critical qualifier “that indefinite detention for the purpose of interroga-
tion is not authorized.”140 Turning from the threshold question of detention
authority to the issue of due process, moreover, Justice O’Connor rejected the
Executive Branch’s assertions of breathtaking presidential power. “We reaffirm
today the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary
District of New York in connection with its grand-jury investigation into the September 11 terrorist
attacks. He was then detained as an alleged “enemy combatant” in the Consolidated Naval Brig in
Charleston, South Carolina by order of President Bush. See id. at 2715–16. Seeking to challenge his
indefinite detention, Padilla filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the New York federal court
against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. The Court, through the Chief Justice, did not decide the merits
of the controversy, holding instead that Padilla had sued the wrong person in the wrong court. In
particular, the Court held that Melanie A. Marr, the commander of the South Carolina Naval Brig, was
the only proper respondent to Padilla’s petition because she, not Secretary Rumsfeld, was Padilla’s
custodian. Id. at 2717–22. The Court further concluded that the Southern District of New York did not
have personal jurisdiction over Commander Marr. Id. at 2722–25. For a discussion of some of the
reasons why the Court’s procedural holding in Padilla is problematic, see Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in
Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951,
1983–88 (2005). See also The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 248,
416–26 (2004) (arguing that the Court should have conducted a traditional venue inquiry).
136. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). The question presented in Rasul was “whether United States courts
lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured
abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guanta´namo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.” Id. at
2690. The Court held that federal courts possess statutory jurisdiction to hear such challenges. Id. at
2699.
137. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (“The Government maintains that no explicit congressional
authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to
Article II of the Constitution.”); see also Brief for the Respondents at 13–18, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (No. 03-6696) (advancing this argument).
138. Justice O’Connor relied on the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), which authorizes the President to use “all necessary and appropriate
force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.
139. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639–40.
140. Id. at 2641.
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confinement by his own government without due process of law,”141 she wrote,
underscoring that “[i]t is during our most challenging and uncertain moments
that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in
those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for
which we fight abroad.”142 Through these words, with which most of her
colleagues agreed, it is almost as if Justice O’Connor was rejecting the premise
of Korematsu on behalf of the Court and vowing never to make the same
mistake again.143 “We therefore hold,” she wrote, “that a citizen-detainee
seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut
the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”144 “In so
holding,” Justice O’Connor continued:
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circum-
stances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the
individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention
scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers,
as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of
government. We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citi-
zens. . . . Likewise, we have made clear that, unless Congress acts to suspend
it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a
necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as
an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of
detentions. . . . Thus, while we do not question that our due process assess-
ment must pay keen attention to the particular burdens faced by the Executive
in the context of military action, it would turn our system of checks and
balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court
with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government,
simply because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge.
Absent suspension of the writ by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy
combatant is entitled to this process.145
Four other Justices, moreover, would have gone further.146
141. Id. at 2647.
142. Id. at 2648.
143. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming petitioner’s conviction for
remaining in part of a designated “military area” from which persons of Japanese ancestry had been
ordered excluded); see also supra note 12 (discussing why petitioner’s conviction was ultimately set
aside).
144. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648.
145. Id. at 2650–51.
146. See id. at 2652–60 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment) (concluding that congressional authorization was necessary to detain Hamdi
and determining that Hamdi’s detention was unlawful based on a lack of congressional authorization);
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Turning to the circumstances of Hamdi’s detention, Justice O’Connor pulled
no punches in assessing the Government’s conduct to date: “Plainly, the ‘pro-
cess’ Hamdi has received is not that to which he is entitled under the Due
Process Clause.”147 Justice O’Connor also clarified the scope of Hamdi’s right
of access to counsel:
Since our grant of certiorari in this case, Hamdi has been appointed counsel,
with whom he has met for consultation purposes on several occasions, and
with whom he is now being granted unmonitored meetings. He unquestion-
ably has the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on
remand.148
In sum, Justice O’Connor made clear that neither assertions of presidential
power nor pleas for judicial restraint would succeed in removing the Court from
the critical separation-of-powers dynamic “when individual liberties are at
stake.”149
At the same time, however, the plurality declined to announce that detained
enemy combatants always have a right to counsel. Further, Justice O’Connor
went on to write that “[h]earsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the
most reliable available evidence from the Government in [an enemy combatant]
proceeding;”150 that “the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption
in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a
rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided;”151 and that
“[t]here remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be
met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribu-
nal.”152
id. at 2660–74 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding based on an extensive historical
analysis that Hamdi’s detention was unlawful absent suspension of the writ of habeas corpus). Justice
Souter’s opinion explicitly draws upon Korematsu’s rejection by the court of history. See id. at 2653–56
(repeatedly emphasizing that Congress acted with “the purpose of avoiding another Korematsu” in
passing the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which provides that “[n]o citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress”).
147. Id. at 2651 (plurality opinion).
148. Id. at 2652.
149. Id. at 2650.
150. Id. at 2649.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2651 (citing Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees, Army Regulation 190-8, §§ 1–6 (1997)). Army Regulation 190-8 was adopted to implement
the Geneva Convention. It specifies the procedures that administrative military tribunals must follow in
determining a detainee’s prisoner-of-war (POW) status. Id.; see also Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2658 (Souter,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Government
was violating Army Regulation 190-8 because the President, not a competent military tribunal, had
determined the POW status of Taliban detainees, including Hamdi). The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit recently considered the Government’s appeal of a district court
ruling adopting Justice Souter’s reasoning and applying it to the detainees at Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba.
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (Robertson, J.), appeal docketed, No.
04-5393 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 2004). On July 15, 2005, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s
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Whatever the reason Perilous Times does not include discussion of Hamdi,
Padilla, and Rasul—it probably has to do with the timing of the decisions
relative to when the book went to press—this is a significant omission, one
Professor Stone hopefully will address in other writing. The historical research
reflected in Perilous Times renders him well situated to assess the performance
of each branch in those cases, as well as to analyze the wisdom of the public’s
reaction, an issue discussed below.
B. THE FATE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE “WAR ON TERROR”
Using “history as a gauge,” Professor Stone ends by briefly evaluating the
Bush Administration’s reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.153
His general assessment is that the government’s response “has been both
positive and negative,”154 though he devotes almost all his attention to the latter.
On the one hand, he remarks, “President Bush deserves credit for his response
to the risk of hostile public reactions against Muslims and Muslim Ameri-
cans.”155 Further, he observes that so far “there have been no federal criminal
prosecutions of any individuals for criticizing the [Bush] administration’s poli-
cies against terrorism.”156 He concludes that “the cultural, political, and constitu-
tional barriers the United States has erected to protect antiwar speech from
outright suppression are higher than they have ever been, and thus far they have
held.”157
On the other hand, Professor Stone notes that officials in the Bush Administra-
tion “have used fear to their political advantage and tarred their opponents as
‘disloyal’”; those officials have stated that public criticism of the Administra-
tion’s policies serves the interests of only the terrorists.158 He is concerned as
well about the far-reaching powers claimed by the Administration to address the
security crisis:
The more questionable restrictions included indefinite detention, with no
access to judicial review, of more than a thousand noncitizens who were
lawfully in the United States and had not been charged with any crime;
blanket secrecy concerning the identity of these detainees; refusal to permit
many of these detainees to communicate with an attorney; an unprecedented
assertion of authority to eavesdrop on constitutionally protected attorney-
client communications; secret deportation proceedings; the incarceration for
judgment, holding that, among other things, Congress had authorized the military commissions at
Guanta´namo Bay, the Geneva Convention gave detainees no right to enforce the treaty’s provisions in
court, and the Guanta´namo military commissions satisfied Army Regulation 109-8’s “competent
tribunal” requirement. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
153. STONE, supra note 1, at 550–51.
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more than two years of an American citizen, arrested on American soil,
incommunicado, with no access to a lawyer, solely on the basis of an
executive determination that he was an “enemy combatant”; significant new
limitations on the scope of the Freedom of Information Act; expanded author-
ity to conduct undercover infiltration and surveillance of political and reli-
gious groups; increased power to wiretap, engage in electronic eavesdropping,
and covertly review Internet and e-mail communications; new power secretly
to review banking, brokerage, and other financial records; and expanded
authority to conduct clandestine physical searches.159
Professor Stone also criticizes the “atmosphere of urgency and alarm”160 in
which Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, a statute drafted by the Justice
Department.161 In his view, there was no “serious deliberation,” resulting in “a
statute that has fairly been characterized as opportunistic and excessive.”162
Specifically, he underscores: the inclusion into the law of several controversial
investigative practices that have nothing to do with fighting terrorism; the Act’s
failure to require reasonable executive-branch accountability; the absence of
traditional checks and balances in the statute; and the law’s disregard of the
basic principle of narrow tailoring when the government seeks to interfere with
civil liberties.163
Once the initial post-September 11 fears settled, Professor Stone observes,
Congress became less deferential to bold assertions of executive authority.
Hence, Congress balked when Attorney General John Ashcroft announced his
intent to implement a Terrorism Information and Prevent System (TIPS),164
which would have encouraged citizens to spy on one another and report
suspicious activities to the government.165 Similarly, the Justice Department’s
plans for a second controversial PATRIOT Act, the Domestic Security Enhance-
ment Act of 2003,166 met with widespread and effective opposition from the
public, the press, and a bipartisan coalition in Congress.167
159. Id. at 552.
160. Id. at 553.
161. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
162. STONE, supra note 1, at 553.
163. Id.
164. See Dan Eggen, Under Fire, Justice Shrinks TIPS Program, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2002, at A1
(describing the program’s unpopularity).
165. STONE, supra note 1, at 553.
166. See Charles Lane, U.S. May Seek Wider Anti-Terror Powers, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2003, at A1
(describing the program); Domestic Security Enhancement Act (proposed), confidential memo (2003),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/PatriotAct/story_01_020703_doc_1.pdf (proposing reduced judi-
cial oversight over surveillance, creation of a DNA database resting only on executive “suspicion,”
removal of judicial restraints on local police spying on religious and political organizations, federal-
government authority to obtain library and credit-card records without a warrant, and federal-
government authority to keep secret the identity of any individual detained in a terror investigation).
167. STONE, supra note 1, at 553–54.
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Professor Stone also submits that “[t]he Bush administration went out of its
way after September 11 to excite rather than calm public fears,” declaring a
“war on terrorism” that might never end to justify the assertion of extraordinary
executive powers.168 He is equally concerned that an administration, once
again, “may have seriously misled the American people in order to heighten the
public’s insecurity and build support for escalating the war.”169 He writes: “Just
as the Federalists exaggerated the risk of a French invasion in 1798 to justify a
military buildup, and Lyndon Johnson exaggerated the events surrounding the
Tonkin Gulf incident in order to justify a more aggressive strategy in Vietnam,
George Bush exaggerated the evidence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of
mass destruction in order to justify his invasion of Iraq.”170
Moreover, Professor Stone is highly critical of former Attorney General
Ashcroft’s dismantling of longstanding Department of Justice guidelines, which
has enabled the FBI to monitor many political and religious activities without
making a showing of potential criminal behavior and without conducting those
investigations with the special care that has traditionally been required.171 “The
effect,” he claims, “is to expose religious and political organizations to exten-
sive FBI monitoring without any objective grounds for suspicion and with much
reduced supervisory control.”172
Finally, Professor Stone stresses “[a]n even more troubling free speech issue
arising out of the ‘war’ on terrorism”: the Bush Administration’s democracy-
undermining “obsession with secrecy.”173 Examples include the refusal to
disclose the names of those detained after September 11; the narrowing of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA);174 the unprecedented closing of deporta-
tion proceedings; and the redaction of “sensitive” information from tens of
thousands of government documents and websites. Such “obsessive secrecy,” he
concludes, “effectively constrains oversight by both the press and the public and
directly undermines the vitality of democratic governance.”175
C. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD
Perilous Times thus finds plenty to criticize in the Bush Administration’s
conduct since September 11. Events occurring after the book was written (in
addition to the facts of the Supreme Court cases discussed above) have provided
further cause for concern.176 A non-exhaustive list includes the scandal at the
168. Id. at 554.
169. Id. at 555.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 555–56.
172. Id. at 556.
173. Id.
174. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
175. STONE, supra note 1, at 557.
176. See supra Part III.A.
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Office of Legal Counsel over the so-called “torture memos”;177 the now-
undisputed findings that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, despite the
Bush Administration’s many assertions to the contrary;178 the 9/11 Commis-
sion’s findings that Iraq had no substantial connection to Al Qaeda, also despite
the Administration’s contrary claims;179 and various controversies over the
United States’ interrogation practices—including strong evidence of torture—in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba—particularly the Abu Ghraib
prison scandal.180 It might be instructive to learn Professor Stone’s views of
those events in light of his extensive historical research.
For present purposes, the basic question is whether Professor Stone’s histori-
cal thesis provides an insightful analysis of recent events. To be sure, the
accumulated lessons of experience do not apply seamlessly to a post-9/11
world. In no previous conflict did technology empower a lone terrorist to kill
literally thousands of Americans in one catastrophic event. A nuclear bomb in a
suitcase in the middle of a city, or a biological or chemical agent in a food or
water supply could effect just that horrific result. The government’s interest in
information may be more compelling now than at any point in our history. In
Hamdi, for example, only Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Justice Stevens,
acknowledged this weighty question, though he did not deem himself compe-
tent to resolve it.181 The government’s interest in interrogation may now justify
177. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos; Most Scholars Reject Broad
View of Executive’s Power, WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at A12 (discussing the memos, which both
asserted that the executive had the inherent power to carry out certain kinds of torture and defined
torture so narrowly that certain acts most Americans would regard as torture would not be deemed
such).
178. See Glen Kessler, Bush Recasts Rationale for War After Report, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2004, at
A32 (discussing President Bush’s changing rationale for the war in Iraq).
179. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 REPORT
334–336 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov.
180. See, e.g., Bradley Graham, No Pattern of Prisoner Abuse, General Says; All Who Are Found
Guilty Will Be Held Accountable, Abizaid Tells Senators, WASH. POST, May 20, 2004, at A23 (discussing
the prisoner abuse at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq); Josh White, Abuse Report Widens Scope
of Culpability; Generals Point to Contractors, Military Intelligence Soldiers, WASH. POST, Aug. 26,
2004, at A1 (discussing the interrogation methods used in Afghanistan and Guanta´namo Bay); ANTONIO
M. TABUGA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (“The Taguba Report”)
(2004), http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (detailing the abuse at Abu Ghraib and
its genesis in Afghanistan and Guanta´namo Bay).
181. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2673 (2004) (“I frankly do not know whether these tools
are sufficient to meet the Government’s security needs, including the need to obtain intelligence
through interrogation. It is far beyond my competence, or the Court’s competence, to determine that.”).
Some zealous defenders of civil liberties regard Justice Scalia’s conclusion in Hamdi as congenial even
though they do not typically endorse predominantly historical legal analyses. It is not apparent,
however, why history should be dispositive in the face of unprecedented technological and political
developments. Justice Scalia’s view would prevent Congress from explicitly authorizing and routiniz-
ing an executive enemy-combatant-designation scheme, or else might require Congress to squint at the
Suspension Clause’s requirements of “Rebellion” or “Invasion.” See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2673–74 (“If
the situation demands it, the Executive can ask Congress to authorize suspension of the writ—which
can be made subject to whatever conditions Congress deems appropriate, including even the procedural
novelties invented by the plurality today. To be sure, suspension is limited by the Constitution to cases
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certain otherwise excessive restrictions on civil liberties.
At the risk of belaboring the point, it is worth pausing to consider just how
much times appear to have changed. In 1951, Justice Jackson offered these
words in concluding a public address:
It is customary to tell students how urgently these great issues challenge them,
and how soon they will have to face the greatest challenge of history. I forbear
such extravagances. The problems of liberty and authority ahead are slight in
comparison with those of the 1770’s or the 1860’s. We shall blunder and
dispute, and decide and overrule decisions. And the common sense of the
American people will preserve us from all extremes which would destroy our
heritage.182
Would it be an “extravagance” to suggest that the liberty and authority problems
of our time compare favorably to those of the Revolution and Civil War? It is
not obvious that such a claim would be an overstatement.
Yet there is much to explore here, for the more things change in the ways
described above, the more they appear to stay the same in the ways documented
in Perilous Times. The intensity of the government’s security interest may be
greater now, but the Bush Administration has proven itself to be no more
trustworthy than past administrations in its exercise of executive power. It is not
apparent how much of the conduct for which the Bush Administration is
responsible has made our country safer. United States military lawyers, for
example, have expressed great concern that our failure to comply with the
Geneva Conventions and our harsh interrogation tactics render American troops
more vulnerable in the event they are captured.183
In the cases of alleged enemy combatants, moreover, the government’s
violations of individual rights have not furthered its legitimate security con-
cerns. There seems to be no reason to believe that according the various
detainees a fact-finding hearing before a neutral magistrate would have endan-
gered national security. For instance, it is difficult to discern—and the Bush
Administration has not identified—any harm to the country that would have
resulted had the government run the Article 5 “competent tribunals” required
of rebellion or invasion. But whether the attacks of September 11, 2001, constitute an ‘invasion,’ and
whether those attacks still justify suspension several years later, are questions for Congress rather than
this Court.”). It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Justice Scalia went further in protecting civil liberties
than Justices Souter and Ginsburg were prepared to go. See supra note 146.
182. Jackson, supra note 25, at 117.
183. See JAMES R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD
DETENTION OPERATIONS 34 (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf;
see also Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Judge Halts War-Crime Trial at Guanta´namo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004 at
A14 (“Scott L. Silliman, professor of military law at Duke University, said . . . that in asserting that the
Guanta´namo prisoners are unlawful combatants and outside the reach of the Geneva Conventions, ‘the
government has asserted a position starkly different from the positions and behavior of the United
States in previous conflicts, one that can only weaken the United States’ own ability to demand
application of the Geneva [Conventions] to Americans captured during armed conflicts abroad.’”).
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under the Third Geneva Convention—to which the United States is a party—to
determine whether the Guanta´namo detainees were prisoners of war.184
Nor would the nation’s safety have been imperiled had the government
accorded Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla minimal due process by allowing
them to challenge the government’s factual allegations against them. The
government’s stated interest in not allowing a defense attorney to destroy the
interrogation environment185 did not have much force in Rumsfeld v. Padilla.186
Before President Bush declared Padilla an enemy combatant, the government
had held him on a material witness warrant in New York, where he had
“conferred” with his court-appointed counsel “in person.”187 As for Hamdi, the
government’s concerns could have been met in several ways short of locking
him up in the South Carolina Naval Brig and allowing him no outside contact
for more than two years. One option might have been to grant Hamdi limited,
monitored access to counsel for the sole purpose of challenging his alleged
enemy-combatant status.
Indeed, one struggles in vain to understand how the country has been
rendered safer by President Bush’s unprecedented assertion of authority to
declare U.S. citizens apprehended anywhere “enemy combatants” and to detain
them indefinitely, incommunicado, without access to counsel, and with only
minimal judicial review of the facts supporting the executive allegation of
enemy-combatant status.188 Regrettably, the government’s conduct in Hamdi
was distressing. Hamdi was denied counsel, allegedly because the insertion of a
184. See supra note 152 (discussing the Army regulation adopted to implement the Third Geneva
Convention, which mandated that a competent military tribunal determine a detainee’s prisoner-of-war
status); see also supra note 183.
185. See, e.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[P]roperly accounting for the
Government’s interests also requires concluding that access to counsel and to the factual basis would
not always be warranted. Though common sense suffices, the Government thoroughly explains that
counsel would often destroy the intelligence gathering function. See Brief for Respondents 42–43. See
also App. 347–351 (affidavit of Col. D. Woolfolk).”). Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2735
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating and
preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber. Access to counsel for the purpose of
protecting the citizen from official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due process.” (citation
omitted)).
186. See supra note 135.
187. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2730 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652–53 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Government contends that Hamdi has no basis for any challenge
by petition for habeas except to his own status as an enemy combatant; and even that challenge may go
no further than to enquire whether ‘some evidence’ supports Hamdi’s designation; if there is ‘some
evidence,’ Hamdi should remain locked up at the discretion of the Executive. At the argument of this
case, in fact, the Government went further and suggested that as long as a prisoner could challenge his
enemy combatant designation when responding to interrogation during incommunicado detention he
was accorded sufficient process to support his designation as an enemy combatant. (‘[H]e has an
opportunity to explain it in his own words’ ‘[d]uring interrogation’). Since on either view judicial
enquiry so limited would be virtually worthless as a way to contest detention, the Government’s
concession of jurisdiction to hear Hamdi’s habeas claim is more theoretical than practical, leaving the
assertion of Executive authority close to unconditional.” (citations omitted)).
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defense lawyer would poison the interrogation environment, yet he was granted
counsel as a matter of executive “discretion” on the day the government’s brief
in opposition to Hamdi’s petition for certiorari was due at the Supreme Court.189
Then, after eight of the nine Justices rejected the President’s position and the
Court held that Hamdi was constitutionally entitled to a fact-determining hear-
ing before a neutral magistrate,190 the government struck a deal with Hamdi and
released him rather than provide such a hearing.191 One wonders what happened
to the grave threat to national security that Hamdi had allegedly posed. One also
wonders how long Hamdi would have remained in solitary confinement in the
South Carolina Naval Brig had the Supreme Court not intervened.
Jose Padilla refiled his habeas petition in the United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina.192 The government was there litigating vigor-
ously193 despite the apparent existence of five votes for the proposition that
Padilla’s detention had not been authorized by Congress.194 The district court
held that the government had to either criminally charge Padilla or release him.
But on September 9, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the AUMF autho-
rized the President to detain Padilla militarily.195 It remains to be seen whether
the Supreme Court will grant certiorari.
189. See Jerry Markon, Military to Watch Prisoner Interview: Hamdi’s Lawyer Resents Monitoring,
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2004, at B3 (“Armed with the favorable ruling, the Bush administration refused to
allow Hamdi to see an attorney. But it reversed itself last month when the Pentagon announced that
Hamdi would be allowed access to counsel because his intelligence value had been exhausted and that
giving him a lawyer would not harm national security. The announcement, which came on the eve of a
government filing due at the Supreme Court, said the decision ‘should not be treated as a precedent’ for
other cases in which the government had determined that someone is an enemy combatant.”).
190. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635–75. Only Justice Thomas accepted the President’s argument. See id.
at 2674–85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. See Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia; U.S. Citizen’s Detention as Enemy
Combatant Sparked Fierce Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2.
192. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla v. Hanft, Civ. No. 2:04CV2221 (D.S.C. July 2,
2004).
193. See, e.g., Phil Hirschkorn, Attorneys for Accused Enemy Combatant Demand U.S. Prove its
Case, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/01/06/padilla.hearing/ (“On Wednesday, defense
attorneys and prosecutors argued over the legality of Padilla’s detention for more than two hours before
U.S. District Judge Henry Floyd. . . . The government relied on the U.S. Constitution and the congres-
sional authorization of the use of force against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks as grounds
for Bush’s action. ‘The argument basically is under (the congressional authorization) and the president’s
inherent authority as commander-in-chief, he had the appropriate authority to declare Mr. Padilla an
enemy combatant under these facts and detain him,’ said Assistant U.S. Attorney Miller Shealy.”).
194. The fives votes are those of the four Padilla dissenters plus that of Justice Scalia in Hamdi. See
supra note 126. In Padilla, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer wrote:
“Consistent with the judgment of the Court of Appeals, I believe that the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a), prohibits—and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, 115 Stat. 224,
adopted on September 18, 2001, does not authorize—the protracted, incommunicado detention of
American citizens arrested in the United States.” 124 S. Ct. at 2735 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is
possible, however, that Justice Breyer could deem Padilla’s detention not “incommunicado,” and
therefore authorized, insofar as he receives the process specified in Hamdi. The Fourth Circuit did not
address the question whether Padilla is due at least as much process as Hamdi.
195. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
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The point of these illustrations is that in a post-9/11 world, many of the
lessons of history Professor Stone identifies remain salient. If left to its own
devices, the government will tend to underprotect civil liberties even when no
discernible benefit to security results. Accordingly, skepticism—not deference—
should be the judiciary’s basic posture in reviewing the constitutionality of
executive-detention activities in wartime.
Unfortunately, another lesson of history is relevant here: Rather than holding
fast to what Professor Stone has called “a culture of civil liberties,”196 much of
the public does not seem concerned about the government’s conduct in the
enemy combatant cases—or the situation at Guanta´namo Bay. The President has
asserted authority to declare anyone an enemy combatant, even citizens living
and working in the United States. Perhaps the general public’s apparent lack of
anxiety is attributable to its having categorized the issue as pertaining only to
minority “others.” It is difficult to believe that the Bush Administration would
have proceeded the same way had citizens expressed widespread outrage; the
political cost would have been too high.
The American public, therefore, would profit from reading Professor Stone’s
book and internalizing its message. The utopian quality of that sentiment,
however, points to a deep, unspoken problem lurking beneath the pages of
Perilous Times. The book is accessible to most citizens and therefore instanti-
ates its theme by contributing to the (re)creation of the culture of civil liberties
in this country that its author rightly regards as essential. Yet the more effec-
tively Perilous Times gives instance to the values it defends, the greater is the
paradoxical tragedy that the work will not receive the public reception and
widespread readership it deserves. At best, scholarly contributions of this sort
influence the popular political culture only in indirect, highly mediated ways.
The sad truth is that most Americans do not read much at all, let alone consult
trenchant books of legal history.197 Ultimately, it falls upon various public and
private institutions to pick up the slack. Perilous Times will help them to
execute their responsibilities.
CONCLUSION
Although it remains unclear how to persuade Americans to care more about
civil liberties in times of national crisis, Professor Stone convincingly argues
that they should learn the lessons of their shared past so as to properly value
196. STONE, supra note 1, at 537.
197. Hence political rhetoric and sensational portrayals of events play at least as prominent a role in
political discourse in the United States as do basic facts. Consider, for example, how long many
Americans have persisted in the belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed weapons of mass
destruction and had close ties to al Qaeda when President Bush ordered an invasion. See, e.g., Richard
Cohen, Editorial, Hold Bush Accountable, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2004, at A25 (“Dana Milbank recently
reported on a poll showing that 72 percent of Bush’s supporters believe Iraq did in fact possess
weapons of mass destruction and that 75 percent believed Hussein gave al Qaeda ‘substantial support.’
These beliefs are false, in contradiction of the facts, and even Bush, when pressed, has admitted that.”).
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civil liberties in confronting the security challenges of this unsettling time. The
lessons of history he underscores are deeply relevant to the decisions citizens
make in selecting the leaders who will determine how to balance the liberty
Americans cherish and the security they demand. A more-informed citizenry
tends to choose leaders who make more-informed decisions. Or, at least, that is
the theory of government on which Americans have staked both their freedom
and their safety.
Even for Americans who want to learn from those who came before them,
however, a significant impediment is that few citizens are self-taught in the
discipline of recalling their shared past. Professor Stone provides the sort of
teaching that makes such learning possible; he brings the Republic’s relevant
history to life in a way that is as accessible to laypersons as it is to lawyers. In
enabling Americans to situate contemporary debates about liberty and security
in a broader historical context, therefore, Professor Stone has performed a great
service to this country at a critical juncture in its development. If Perilous Times
eventually becomes integrated into the national consciousness to the extent its
contribution warrants, it will be more difficult to convince citizens that signifi-
cant curtailments of civil liberties in the “war on terror” are necessarily desir-
able, unavoidable in any event, and undeserving of robust judicial review. Then,
when the assertions of a current administration essentially reduce to the sugges-
tion that “[y]ou are scared—trust us,”198 Americans will be prepared to act on a
response of this order: “Yes, we are afraid—but we understand that trust
without verification is antithetical to democracy and the rule of law, and our
courage is greater than our fear.”
Professor Stone has completed his work with skill and sensitivity to those
enduring values of the American constitutional culture that are threatened in the
time in which we live. Let us hope the branches of the federal government,
states, the news media, educational institutions, the legal academy, civil-
liberties organizations, and a significant number of fellow citizens perform their
roles with similar care in the years to come. Let us hope their efforts evidence
an adequate appreciation of the lessons of history that Professor Stone has so
ably expressed.
198. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 1, at 555 (“As the former ambassador James Goodby has written, in
the Bush administration fear has too often ‘become the underlying theme of domestic and foreign
policy.’ The ‘bottom line has been . . . ‘You are scared—trust us.””) (quoting James Goodby & Kenneth
Weisbrode, Bush’s Corrosive Campaign of Fear, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 19, 2003) (alteration in
original)); see also, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, at 45–46, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(No. 03-6696) (“MR. DUNHAM: May it please the Court. Mr. Clement [the Principal Deputy Solicitor
General] is a worthy advocate and he can stand up here and make the unreasonable sound reasonable.
But when you take his argument at core, it is, ‘Trust us.’ And who is saying trust us? The executive
branch. And why do we have the great writ? We have the great writ because we didn’t trust the
executive branch when we founded this Government. That’s why the Government is saying trust us is
no excuse for taking away and driving a truck through the right of habeas corpus and the Fifth
Amendment that no man shall be deprived of liberty except upon due process of law.”).
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